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I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in genetics and molecular biology have changed our
views on what life means and what a human being is.' They will
ultimately reshape the interpretation of terms such as "reproduction,
individuality, history, freedom and subjectivity."2 For the past several
decades, emerging frontiers of biotechnology have grown
dramatically and continue to offer innovative methods to detect,
diagnose, and treat diseases. Recently, much of the attention of the
biotechnology industry has been focused on the Human Genome
Project, which has a primary goal of producing a roadmap of the
human genome.3 The potential being delivered by this gene map is
immense, as the knowledge on gene sequences can serve as a starting
point for scientists to understand the functions of genes and how
alterations in gene' structure and function may affect a disease state.4
Genomics 5 has not only become a "vast scientific" venture but also a
"commercial enterprise." 6  Both public and private sectors have
entered into this arena to search for new and better ways to prepare
vaccinations, cure diseases, and relieve the suffering caused by
debilitating conditions. In the meantime, researchers have sought for
7and obtained patents to protect their knowledge of human genes.
The World Health Organization has reported that an increasing
number of patent applications have been filed to claim inventions
related to gene sequences. 8  These patent applications and granted
1. Jdnos Boros & Andrhs Guttman, Genetism: Genes and Society, 3
GENOMIC/PROTEOMIC TECH. 6 (2003).
2. Id.
3. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, The Ethics of Patenting DNA - A Discussion
Paper 3 (July 23, 2002),
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/filelibrary/pdf/theethicsofpatentingdna.pdf
(last visited Jan. 9, 2004) [hereinafter NUFFIELD COUNCIL].
4. Julian David Forman, A Timing Perspective on the Utility Requirement in
Biotechnology Patent Applications, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 647 (2002).
5. Genomics is generally defined as "investigations into the structure and function of
very large numbers of genes undertaken in a simultaneous fashion." See, UNIV. OF CAL. DAVIS
GENOME CTR., What is Genomics, at http://www.genomecenter.ucdavis.edu/what.html (last
visited Jan. 9, 2004).
6. Jonathan Kahn, What's the Use? Law and Authority in Patenting Human Genetic
Material, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 417 (2003).
7. NUFFIELD COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 3.
8. WORLD HEALTH ORG., GENOMICS AND WORLD HEALTH - REPORT OF ADVISORY
COMM. ON HEALTH RESEARCH (Geneva, 2002), available at
http://www3.who.int/whosis/genomics/pdf/genomics-report.pdf.
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patents have generated considerable discussion and debate on the
acceptability of gene patenting. 9
Generally, in order to obtain a patent, an invention must be a
patentable subject matter that is novel,'0 non-obvious," and useful,12
and must comply with the written disclosure requirements in 35
U.S.C. §112.13 Under current U.S. patent law, a deoxyribonucleic
acid ("DNA") sequence is a patentable subject matter as a
composition of matter or an article of manufacture.' 4  However,
naturally occurring genes are not eligible for a patent; therefore, to be
patentable, a DNA molecule must be "isolated and purified" from its
natural state.' 5 Similar to all other inventions, inventions directed to
DNA sequences also need to fulfill all statutory requirements under
U.S. patent law.
The U.S. economy has become increasingly dependent on
technological innovations. 16 The patent system has worked well for
more than 200 years to foster innovation and its commercial
development. As for other areas of inventions, patent protection for
DNA sequences will be needed to provide incentives to invent and
discover, and to secure new capital for growth.'
7
On the other hand, patenting DNA sequences is not free of
problems. Because of the unique nature of DNA sequences, DNA
technology has fundamentally changed the way that biological and
medical research is conducted. The term, "invention," has acquired a
new meaning, and patents on DNA sequences are intrinsically
different from traditional mechanical patents. As discoveries of new
genes and knowledge gained from genomic research continue to have
substantial impact on development of drugs and therapeutics for
humans,' 8 people have stronger feelings about DNA sequence patents.
Some researchers, physicians, non-profit organizations and religious
9. NUFFIELD COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 3-4.
10. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
11. Id. § 103.
12. Id. § 101.
13. Id. § 112.
14. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001). See also,
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("A gene is a chemical
compound, albeit a complex one....").
15. Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 14, at 1,093.
16. Lee Bendekgey & Diana Hamlet-Cox, Gene Patents and Innovations, 77 ACAD.
MED. 1373, 1375 (Dec. 2002).
17. Emma Toumi, In Defence of Gene Patents, 9 J. OF COM. BIOTECH. 135, 135 (Jan.
2003).
18. NUFFIELD COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 5.
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groups have opposed patenting DNA sequences. 19 They believe that
granting patent rights on DNA sequences will lead to "private
appropriation of the genetic commons., 20  Furthermore, patents have
been issued to cover short DNA fragments, such as expressed
sequence tags ("EST")21  and single nucleotide polymorphisms
("SNP"),22 as well as large fragments that contain genes of medical
interest. Sometimes, the patented small fragments turn out to be part
of the gene covered by the patent claiming the larger fragment.
Under the current system, both patents can co-exist. However, "the
second patent holder may have to obtain licenses from.. .the primary
patent holder but is not prevented form obtaining the second patent.,
23
While the law allows multiple patents to be granted on the same
sequence, certain groups fear that this trend will lead to more
litigation.24 Additionally, others argue allowing DNA patents will
19. Id. See also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Why the Gene Patent Controversy Persists, 77
ACAD. MED. 1381, 1382 (Dec. 2002) (noting that professional associations of doctors have been
particularly outspoken critics of disease gene patents and exclusive licenses for DNA
diagnostics).
20. NUFFIELD COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 5.
21. See NAT'L CTR. FOR BIOTECH. INFO., A Science Primer - ESTs: Gene Discovery
Made Easier, at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/est.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2003)
[hereinafter EST Primer]:
[Expressed sequence tags] are small pieces of DNA sequence (usually 200 to 500
nucleotides long) that are generated by sequencing either one or both ends of an
expressed gene. The idea is to sequence bits of DNA that represent genes
expressed in certain cells, tissues, or organs from different organisms and use
these "tags" to fish a gene out of a portion of chromosomal DNA by matching
base pairs. The challenge associated with identifying genes from genomic
sequences varies among organisms and is dependent upon genome size as well as
the presence or absence of introns, the intervening DNA sequences interrupting
the protein coding sequence ofa gene.
22. See NAT'L CTR. FOR BIOTECH. INFO., A Science Primer - SNPs: Variations On A
Theme, at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/snps.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2004)
[hereinafter SNP Primer]:
A Single Nucleotide Polymorphism ... is a small genetic change, or variation,
that can occur within a person's DNA sequence .... SNP variation occurs when a
single nucleotide, such as an A, replaces one of the other three nucleotide
letters-C, G, or T. An example of a SNP is the alteration of the DNA segment
AAGGTTA to ATGGTTA, where the second "A" in the first snippet is replaced
with a "T". On average, SNPs occur in the human population more than 1
percent of the time .... SNPs found within a coding sequence are of particular
interest to researchers because they are more likely to alter the biological
function of a protein.
23. John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, 280 SCI. 689, 690 (May 1, 1998).
24. John Murray, Owning Genes: Disputes Involving DNA Sequence Patents, 75 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 231, 250 (1999). See also, Melissa Horn, DNA Patenting and Access to
Healthcare: Achieving the Balance Among Competing Interests, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 253, 272
(2003).
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result in higher expenses in obtaining licenses to conduct research,
more costly products, and heavier burdens on the healthcare system.
For example, Myriad Genetics, a U.S. company, holds patents on
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, which indicates susceptibility to breast
cancer. It charges $2,680.00 for each diagnostic test.26 Healthcare
professionals are worried that women at risk for breast cancer will be
adversely affected by Myriad's monopoly.27  Furthermore, while
recognizing that patents protect the intellectual property and efforts of
the inventors, many have expressed concerns that exclusive rights
granted to the inventors of gene patents may block public access to
important information, which in turn will impede genetic research,
inhibit technology development, and ultimately produce an adverse
effect on public health.28
In order to maintain a balance among the competing interests
with regard to patenting DNA sequences, changes are needed to avoid
the pitfalls in the current system. Modifications to the current system
will ensure that gene patents continue to serve their intended purpose
of promoting science and exchange of information, while further
ensuring that exclusive property rights on sequences do not impede
the research and development of new technologies.
This paper argues that some of the concerns posed by patenting
DNA sequences can be addressed through changes made by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"). First, the
U.S. has recently revised its examination guidelines for the utility
requirement and written description requirement.29  The new
heightened guidelines will work to eliminate ineligible claims,
25. U.S. Patent No. 5,710,001 (issued Jan. 20, 1998) and U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282
(issued May 5, 1998). The U.S. company, Myriad Genetics, the University of Utah and the US
Secretary of Health filed these patent applications that were later granted. The applications
claimed rights over the normal BRCAI gene sequence and various mutations, diagnostic tests
for detecting mutations in BRCA1, and methods for screening samples taken from tumors. A
company called OncorMed received the patent on a "consensus sequence" of the BRCA I gene.
U.S. Patent No. 5,654,155 (issued Aug. 5, 1997). The patent claims rights over a method of
identifying individuals with a normal copy of the gene, and of identifying seven mutations of the
gene. Myriad Genetics later acquired the genetic testing business of OncorMed. In 2001,
Myriad Genetics also received a European patent over the use of the BRCA1 gene. European
Patent No. 699754 (issued Jan. 10, 2001). As a result, Myriad Genetics has a temporary
monopoly in many European countries on BRCA I diagnostic testing.
26. Meredith Wadman, Testing Time for Gene Patent as Europe Rebels, 413 NATURE
443, 443 (Oct. 5, 2001).
27. NUFFIELD COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 40.
28. Id. at 5-6.
29. Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1,
"Written Description" Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (Jan. 5, 2001).
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improve the quality of DNA sequence patents, and reduce the
likelihood that a patent may be challenged by a third party. Also, the
inter partes re-examination procedure 30 can serve as an inexpensive
alternative to full litigation in challenging a patent. Furthermore, this
paper will propose solution-oriented reform structures, which are
necessary to improve the current system. A patent pool can be used
as a powerful tool to make obtaining a license much easier.
Additionally, legislative changes including compulsory licensing
schemes and research exemptions will ensure that the granting of
DNA patents does not affect scientific research. Ultimately, a
fundamental reform of the patent law may serve as the true gatekeeper
in guarding against invalid patents.
II. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY - THE BASICS
A gene is the basic unit of heredity.3' It is a sequence of DNA
on a chromosome 32 that encodes a protein or regulates the
transcription of such a sequence.33 Before any cell divides, it
produces a copy of its genes to pass on a complete set to each of its
daughter cells upon division.34 Thus, parent cells, such as sperm and
egg cells, carry and pass on the hereditary information from one
generation to the next.
35
A DNA molecule is a polymer consisting of four nucleotide
bases.36 Each nucleotide is represented by a letter in the alphabet:
adenine (A), cytosine (C), guanine (G), and thymine (T).37 The four
bases are connected together by covalent bonds38 to form a long chain
of DNA.39  Each long strand of nucleotides is paired up with its
30. Final Rule to Implement Inter Partes Reexamination Proceedings, 66 Fed. Reg.
76,756 (Dec. 7, 2000).
31. See PETER H. RAVEN & GEORGE B. JOHNSON, BIOLOGY 59 (2d ed. 1989).
32. See id. (stating that DNA is composed of two complementary chains of nucleotides
arranged in a double helix format); id. at 88, G-5 ("Chromosome: The vehicle by which
hereditary information is physically transmitted from one generation to the next; the organelle
that carries the genes. In bacteria, the chromosomes consist of a single naked circle of DNA; in
eukaryotes, they consist of a single linear DNA molecular and associated proteins.").
33. See id. at 59.
34. BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 98 (2d ed. 1989).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 99.
37. Id.
38. A covalent bond is defined as "a bond in which two electrons are shared by two
atoms." See RAYMOND CHANG, CHEMISTRY 184 (2d ed. 1984).
39. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 34, at 99.
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complementary strand 4' to form a double helix, the three dimensional
42
structure of DNA molecules. Normally, the double helices are
tightly wound together in the cell's nucleus. When duplicates of the
DNA sequences are needed, the helix structure unwinds, and two
strands separate forming a replication fork.4 3 With the aid of DNA
polymerase, 4 two new strands of DNA identical to their parent
strands start to form.45 These replicated DNA molecules carry the
information from the parent cells down to the next generation.
DNA sequences also affect the formation and expression of
proteins. Proteins synthesized under the direction of particular DNA
sequences determine a cell's chemical and physical properties.46
Protein synthesis begins with a process called DNA transcription. 47
In this process, DNA in the double helix structure unwinds into single
strand. Specific regions of the DNA, referred to as coding regions,
are then copied into ribonucleic acid ("RNA"). 48 RNA is similar to
DNA. However, RNA is shorter in length, and differs in chemical
structure. 4 9 After undergoing some chemical changes, RNA exits the
cell's nucleus to function as messenger RNA ("mRNA"), which
directs protein synthesis in the cytoplasm. 50  Then, the process of
translation begins. Translation involves converting the nucleic acid
41. See id. A complementary strand contains sequences that are complementary to the
other strand. For instance, if Strand A has a sequence of CTTAGGCTA, its complementary
partner, Strand B, would have a sequence of GAATCCGAT.
42. Id.
43. RAVEN & JOHNSON, supra note 3 1, at 289, fig. 14-18, caption.
44. A DNA polymerase is an enzyme that catalyzes the process of DNA replication. See
id.
45. Id.
46. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 34, at 106.
47. RAVEN & JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 298.
48. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 34, at 107.
49. Id. RNA is different from DNA in that (1) the sugar-phosphate backbone of RNA
contains ribose instead of a dexoyribose sugar, and (2) the base thymine (T) in DNA is replaced
by the very closely related base uracil (U). RNA is shorter than a DNA molecule because it is
copied from a limited region of the DNA - enough to make one or more proteins. Id.
50. See id. at 107-8. ("The mRNA codons do not directly recognize the amino acids that
they specify in the way that an enzyme recognizes a substrate. Translation uses "adaptor"
molecules that recognize both an amino acid and a group of nucleotide bases. These adaptors
consist of a set of small RNA molecules known as transfer RNAs ... ").
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language, the genetic code, to protein "language."51 The sequences of
nucleotides in mRNA are "read" in sets of three, called a codon
5 2
Each codon specifies which amino acid should be incorporated into
the protein sequence. 3 RNA is made of four different nucleotides.
Thus, there are 64 possible codon triplets that can be "read" to direct
the selection of amino acids.5 4  Nonetheless, there are only 20
different amino acids commonly found in protein.5 5 Therefore, most
amino acids are specified by several codons; "that is, the genetic code
is degenerate." 56 Proteins formed through these processes will then
act to control cell functions.57
Today, much research work on DNA sequences focuses on
deciphering the genome of various organisms, including human,
mouse and yeast.5 A DNA sequence is used to obtain a genomic
sequence and identify a complete set of genes. Ultimately, the goal is
to gain an understanding of how genes work in controlling protein
production, a process commonly known as gene expression.59 Once
we begin to understand where and how a gene is expressed in normal
conditions, we can then examine the gene's function in an altered
state, such as in a particular disease. 60 Before we can truly understand
the genetic aspect of a disease, we must identify and study the link
between a gene and the protein coded by the gene, and the
relationship between a particular protein and a disease of interest.6I
To study the interactions between genes, proteins and diseases,
scientists use short DNA sequences to identify a large family of
62genes. ESTs or SNPs have been useful tools in the hunting for gene
groups and families. Moreover, new technologies, such as DNA
microarrays, have facilitated the process of gene identification and
51. See RAVEN & JOHNSON, supra note 3 1, at 299. ("This process of mRNA-directed
polypeptide synthesis by ribosomes is called translation because nucleotide-sequence
information is translated into amino acid-sequence information.").
52. Id. at 300-301.
53. Id. at 301.
54. d.at 300.
55. Id.
56. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 34, at 108.
57. Id. at 106.
58. See EST Primer, supra note 21.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. See id.
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classification.63 DNA microarrays permit the expression levels of
thousands of genes to be compared and screened on a single glass
chip within hours.64 It is a powerful tool for DNA profiling, drug
research and screening, and development of clinical diagnostic tools
and gene therapies.65
III. PATENT LAW - AN OVERVIEW
The current patent law has its origin in the United States
Constitution. Congress is furnished with an exclusive power by
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries. ' ,66 Based on this power, Congress enacted the first
patent statute in 1790.67 Evolving through the years, modem patent
acts have been codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-376, which provide that
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor ....... ,,6
The patent system was created to "reward inventions," "promote
63. See NAT'L CTR. FOR BIOTECH. INFO., A Science Primer - Microarrays: Chipping
Away at the Mysteries of Science and Medicine, at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/microarrays.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
With only a few exceptions, every cell of the body contains a full set of
chromosomes and identical genes. Only a fraction of these genes are turned on,
however, and it is the subset that is "expressed" that confers unique properties to
each cell type. "Gene expression" is the term used to describe the transcription of
the information contained within the DNA, the repository of genetic information,
into messenger RNA (mRNA) molecules that are then translated into the proteins
that perform most of the critical functions of cells. Scientists study the kinds and
amounts of mRNA produced by a cell to learn which genes are expressed, which
in turn provides insights into how the cell responds to its changing needs. Gene
expression is a highly complex and tightly regulated process that allows a cell to
respond dynamically both to environmental stimuli and to its own changing
needs... DNA Microarrays are small, solid supports onto which the sequences
from thousands of different genes are immobilized, or attached, at fixed
locations. The supports themselves are usually glass microscope slides, the size
of two side-by-side pinky fingers, but can also be silicon chips or nylon
membranes. The DNA is printed, spotted, or actually synthesized directly onto
the support.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
67. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 18 (2d. 2001).
68. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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disclosure of inventions," and assure that "ideas in the public domain
remain there for the free use of the public.,
69
An American patent is a grant by the U.S. government, which
gives the patent owner a "right to "exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United
States or importing the invention into the United States" for a period
of 20 years.70  In exchange for the monopoly, patent owners must
provide a full disclosure of their invention to the public, which
enables a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the
invention. 7  This scheme gives patent owners an opportunity to
protect and recapture their intellectual and monetary investment,
while allowing the general public to enjoy the benefit of new
innovations in a timely fashion.72 To be patentable, an invention must
meet the statutory requirements in 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-376, which
include utility, novelty, non-obviousness, and specifications.
A. Subject Matter
First, the invention must be a patentable subject matter, which
may be processes, machines, articles of manufacture, or compositions
of matter. 73  The Supreme Court in Diamond v. Charkrabarty
interpreted this section expansively, holding that Congress intended
statutory matter to "include anything under the sun made by man." 74
Additionally, the Court also made clear that ideas, natural phenomena
and laws of nature are not patentable.75 In affirming the patentability
of a genetically engineered bacterium that was capable of degrading
components of crude oil, the Court concluded that the inventor has
created "a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from
69. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979). The Supreme Court
said the following about the purpose of the patent system:
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes
disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public
to practice the invention once the patent expires; third, the stringent requirements
for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there
for the free use of the public.
70. 35 U.S.C. § 154. Prior to June 8, 1995, the term for a U.S. patent was 17 years. See
CHISUM ET. AL., supra note 67, at 2 n.6.
71. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
72. Courtney J. Miller, Patent Law and Human Genomics, 26 CAP. U. L. REv. 893, 904-
05 (1997).
73. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
74. 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
75. Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O'Reilly v.
Morse, 15 How. 62, 115 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853)).
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any found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility.
His discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is
patentable subject matter under § 101.,,76 Applying the same logic, a
"purified and isolated" DNA sequence is patentable because, after
scientists extract DNA from its natural state and purify it, it possesses
different properties from its natural counterparts. Under current law,
DNA sequences are being patented as compositions of matter.7
B. Utility
Secondly, an invention must be useful.78 Originating from the
Constitution, 35 U.S.C. § 101 sets forth that "any new and useful"
invention and discovery is entitled to a patent grant.79 An invention
needs to be "operable, 80 that is, it must function for its intended
purpose. 81 The inventor may receive an exclusive right to exclude
only if he or she can show that the invention can serve its "intended
purpose" or "a purpose discernible by a person of ordinary skill in the
art." This utility requirement was enacted to maintain "a quid pro quo
for society.,
82
For mechanical and electrical inventions, establishing utility is
straightforward, as drawings, diagrams or demonstrations are
generally used to show utility.83 However, the same does not hold
true for chemical and biological inventions. Not only is it difficult to
illustrate biological utility through drawings or diagrams, identifying
the applicable utility may also be problematic. Unlike mechanical
inventions that usually have an end result with a proposed use,
biological inventions frequently "possess an evolving utility."84
While the utility of some of biological inventions is considered
general, other inventions have "specific and immediate societal
76. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 310.
77. Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 14, at 1093, cmts. 2-3.
78. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
79. Id. ("Whoever invents or discovers any.. useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter.. may obtain a patent .. "). See also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
("useful Arts").
80. Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter As to The Patentability of
Certain Inventions Associated With the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AM.
INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS'N Q.J 1, 4 (1995) (citing Newmann v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir.
1989)).
81. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 67, at 707.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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utility. '85 Despite the rapid advances in biotechnology over the past
quarter century, many started to question whether the uses purposed
by the inventor are attainable or proven.86 As a result, the utility
requirement has caused more controversy in awarding gene patents.
In 1966, the Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson,87 for the first
time, transformed the utility requirement into a more meaningful
standard for patentability. 88  In rejecting a patent application for a
process to make certain steroids, the court emphasized "the concept of
utility has maintained a central place in all of our patent legislation."
89
The process was not patentable because the asserted utility of the
steroids was solely based on the established usefulness of the
chemical compounds closely related in structure. 90 Thus, the Court
concluded that an invention must have a "substantial" utility to be
patentable.
91
In the early and mid 1990s, patent applications for DNA
sequences increased drastically in numbers. Many of the DNA
sequences that were sought to be patented merely had a "proposed"
utility. Now, in litigation, the patentability of these sequences has
become the center of debate. In response to the concerns and to
ensure only "useful" DNA sequences are patented, the USPTO
modified its Utility Examination Guidelines in 1995 and 1999, raising
the standard for utility, with a particular emphasis on DNA sequence
85. Id. at 708.
86. Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 14, at 1094, cmt. 5.
87. 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
88. Id. at 531-36. See also Nathan Machin, Prospective Utility: A New Interpretation of
the Utility Requirement of Section 101 of the Patent Act, 87 CAL. L. REv. 421, 428-30 (1999)
(discussing the practical utility requirement that was created by the Supreme Court in Brenner).
89. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 529.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 534-35. Justice Fortas said,
The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for
granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention
with substantial utility. Unless and until a process is refined and developed to
this point- where specific benefit exists in currently available form- there
is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove
to be a broad field.
In 1967, the Court of Customs and Patents Appeals extended the reasoning in Brenner and twice
affirmed the USPTO's rejection based on lack of utility. Judge Rich and Judge Smith, the only
two judges with patent law experience, offered dissenting opinions arguing for a more relaxed
standard for utility. See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906
(C.C.P.A. 1967). In the 30 years following Brenner, the Federal Circuit Courts seemed to hold
a more lenient position when it came to showing utility. See Cross v. lizuka, 753 F.2d 1040
(Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).'
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related patents.92 Currently, under the latest guidelines, an invention
must pass a two-inquiry test to establish utility. The sequences
claimed in an invention must have a "well-established" utility, or an
asserted utility that is "specific, substantial and credible."
93
C. Novelty
The third statutory requirement for patentability is novelty,
found in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 102, which require patent holders to
"contribute something new to the society., 94  When "the invention
was known or used by others" either in the U.S., or "patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country," it is no
longer eligible for a patent.95 The reason behind this requirement is
that "it makes no sense to grant someone a patent on an invention that
already exists."'96 Therefore, this requirement ensures that only new
developments, not what is already in existence in the public domain,
are given the privilege of exclusive control.97
Genes in their natural state are not directly accessible and do not
qualify as novel, because additional work is needed to isolate them.
Therefore, an "isolated and purified" DNA molecule or a synthesized
DNA molecule with the same sequence as a naturally occurring gene
is eligible for a patent because the isolated form is a new and novel
product that has been created.98
92. 1995 Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36263, 36264 (July 14, 1995);
The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training Materials, at
3, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/utility.pdf (1999); Utility Examination
Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1098, §§ B(l)(c), (2)(a) (Jan. 5, 2001). See The Fate of Gene Patents
Under the New Utility Guidelines, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8, at 9, available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/ARTICLES/200ldltrOOO8.html (2001) ("The 1999
Revised Interim Utility Guidelines established a heightened standard for utility ... .
93. Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 14, at 1092-93.
94. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement...
..may obtain a patent."); 35 U.S.C. § 102. See also CHISUM ET AL., supra note 67, at 323.
95. 35 U.S.C. § 102 ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless--(a) the invention was
known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent .. .
96. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 67, at 323.
97. Byron V. Olson, The Biotechnology Balancing Act: Patents for Gene Fragments, and
Licensing the "UsefulArts," 7 ALB. L.J. SCt. & TECH. 295 (1997).
98. Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 14, at 1093.
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D. Non-obviousness
Finally, an invention must be non-obvious. 99 The invention
claimed to be patented must not be obvious to "a person having
ordinary skill in the art" at the time the invention was made. l00 In
determining whether a DNA molecule is obvious at the time of
invention, the USPTO must consider whether the DNA with a
particular structure would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill
in the art at the time the invention was made."' 0 1 It is important to
note that in making such a determination, the method used to isolate
the DNA sequences is deemed irrelevant; only the structure of the
molecules is evaluated.10 2 In In re Bell, the court held that when the
inventor tries to patent compositions of matters, the issue is "the
obviousness of the claimed compositions, not of the method by which
they are made.' 0 3
E. Written Descriptions
Lastly, to secure a patent, the inventor must provide
specifications as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112 L.' 4 This section has
two major elements, the written description and the claims. In the
written description, the inventor must disclose his invention in full
detail as to enable any person skilled in the art to make and use the
invention, and set forth a best mode known to the inventor to carry
out the invention. 10 5 In other words, the claimed invention must be
adequately supported by a disclosure so that a "skilled practitioner"
can utilize it without undue experimentation.'0 6  Additionally, the
applicant also needs to "particularly point out and distinctly claim the
99. 35 U.S.C. § 103. ("A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.").
100. Id.
101. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[Tlhe existence of a general
method of isolating cDNA or DNA molecules is essentially irrelevant to the question whether
the specific molecules themselves would have been obvious .. "). See also Utility
Examination Guidelines, supra note 14, at 1095 (citing In re Deuel).
102. NUFFIELD COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 30.
103. 991 F.2d 781, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
104. 35 U.S.C. § 112 1.
105. Id.
106. Eisenberg and Merges, supra note 80, at 4.
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invention." 10 7  The claims give notice to the public of what the
patentee and the USPTO "have agreed constitute the metes and
bounds of the claimed invention."' 1 8  Section 112 serves two
functions-notice to the public and dissemination of information. It
allows third parties to avoid unauthorized infringing conduct.
Meanwhile, it gives the public opportunities to receive "information
that enlarges the storehouse of knowledge" and use it to create
something new or enhance and design around the claimed
invention-ultimately leading to improvement in technological
advances and revolution.1 09
With respect to DNA patent applications, guidance on what kind
of description is needed to satisfy § 112 is found in Regents of
University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co." ° The Federal Circuit
Court held that an adequate description of a DNA "'requires a precise
definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical
properties,' not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed
chemical invention.""' Thus, the written description requirement
must be "a description of the invention, not an indication of a result
that one might achieve if one made that invention."
'
"
12
IV. DNA SEQUENCES PATENTS
The rush of patenting of DNA sequences began in the early
1990s when researchers at the National Institute of Health ("NIH")
discovered a new sequencing technique. The technique utilizes ESTs
as probes to locate specific genes or place-markers on a longer chain
of DNA.1 3 Even though, at that time, ESTs were only proven to have
limited functions as probes or markers, people saw the downstream
commercial value of ESTs: using or licensing ESTs that may code for
a particular gene, which may be used to study and create a
blockbuster drug that can treat a specific condition. NIH filed patent
applications for more than three hundred cDNA sequences and
ESTs.114 In the subsequent ten years, companies began grabbing up
107. § 112.
108. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
109. CHISUM ET AL, supra note 67, at 161.
110. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
111. Id. at 1566 (citing Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
112. Lilly, 119 F.3dat 1568.
113. EST Primer, supra note 21.
114. See Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A
Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303,
323 (2002).
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any and all sequences they could put their hands on, skyrocketing the
number of patent applications for gene sequences. Big players
include Human Genome Sciences with 450 patent applications
claiming more than 34,000 sequences, Millennium Pharmaceuticals
with over 300 patents containing 2,753 sequences, Incyte
Pharmaceuticals with 4,500 sequences from more than 570 patent
applications, and many more." 5 Nearly a million sequences have
been claimed in patent applications worldwide."
6
Patents on human genes can be divided into four basic
categories, which are diagnostic tests, research tools, protein coding
sequences, and gene therapies." I7  When a DNA sequence is
"significantly implicated in a disease" it "can provide the basis for a
diagnostic test."'"18  For example, OncorMed patented sequences
coding for the BRCA1 gene which have diagnostic properties. 119
They can be used for screening individuals with an increased genetic
susceptibility to breast or ovarian cancer. 120  Another example of a
patented diagnostic gene is INGI, which is useful in diagnosing both
brain cancer and breast cancer.' 21
Research tools are sequences that have a use in research, but
usually have "no immediate therapeutic or diagnostic value."''
22
Expressed sequence tags are examples of research tools. In 1998, the
first EST patent was issued to Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 23  The
patent claims EST sequences encoding novel protein kinases which
can be used to identify homologous protein kinases expressed in
various human cells and tissues.
124
DNA sequences that code for proteins are also being patented.
One type of protein coding sequence encodes a particular protein
115. Giles Stokes, Patent Applications of Genetic Sequences on the Up (Apr. 2000), at
http://thomsonderwent.com/ipmatters/patlife/8205003 (last visited Jan. 14, 2004).
116. Id. at illus.
117. NUFFIELD COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 64. See also Jorge A. Goldstein & Elina Golod,
Human Gene Patents, 77 ACAD. MED. 1315, 1316 (Dec. 2002) (noting the USPTO issues
patents to isolated or purified human genes encoding protein drugs, diagnostic probes, receptors,
immunogens, and gene replacement therapies).
118. NUFFIELD COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 48.
119. U.S. Patent No. 5,750,400 (issued May 12, 1998).
120. Id.
121. U.S. Patent No. 6,238,918 (issued May 29, 2001).
122. NUFFIELD COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 56.
123. U.S. Patent No. 5,817,479 (issued Oct. 6, 1998).
124. Id. See WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 530 (2001) (defining
"homologous" as "similar or corresponding in position, value, structure, or function;
corresponding in structure and evolutionary origin... ; having the same linear sequence of
genes as another chromosome.").
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where the protein itself has a therapeutic function. ARCH
Development patented a series of sequences encoding calpain 10 that
can be used to diagnose and treat type 2 diabetes. 25 Another type of
sequence patented under this category includes genes that encode
targets such as receptors. Human Genome Sciences, Inc. holds a
patent on sequences coding for human triO receptor, which is a
member of the tumor necrosis factor receptor family and the TRAIL
receptor family. 126 The receptor expressed by the claimed gene is
useful in high-throughput drug screening.
127
V. CONCERNS AND PROBLEMS POSED BY PATENTING SEQUENCES
As biotechnology is rapidly growing, patents have been used to
protect developments and commercial possibilities and potentials
arising from genetic research. 128 Because the number of applications
filed to claim DNA sequences is dramatically increasing, many are
concerned that patenting DNA will lead to problems having a
negative impact on technological development in the molecular
biology area. 129 The questions and fears may be classified into two
groups, upstream research and downstream products.
A. Effect of Upstream Research on Downstream Development
Thirty years ago, when Garrett Hardin introduced the "commons
model," upstream research was generally pre-market research funded
by the federal government, created to encourage wide dissemination
and propagation of results in the public domain.' 30 Now, biomedical
research has been moving toward a "privatization model," as it is
supported by private funds, carried out in private organizations, or
protected by patents that guarantee exclusive private ownership.
13
Patent rights for upstream research tools were initially offered to
attract private investments. 132 Now academic institutions use patent
rights to secure subsequent material transfer agreements, which can
125. U.S. Patent No. 6,235,481 (issued May 22, 2001).
126. U.S. Patent No. 6,214,580 (issued Apr. 10, 2001).
127. Id.
128. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 13.
129. Id., at 4-6.
130. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (Dec. 13, 1968). See
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698 (May 1, 1998).
131. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 130.
132. Id.
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produce additional, hefty royalty payments. 133  Private companies,
such as genomics firms, seek to market patented research tools to
pharmaceutical companies.134  Consequently, DNA sequences,
involved in upstream research and usually patented as research tools,
have been particularly troubling to the scientific community.
Upstream research can directly affect downstream product
development. Professors Heller and Eisenberg noted that the
patenting of research tools leads to "the tragedy of the
anticommons."' 3 5 The tragedy arises "when multiple owners each
have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has
an effective privilege of use."' 36  The result is an under-use of
resources, arising under two mechanisms:-multiple patent holders
and "stacking licenses."
137
For sequences that can be used as research tools, the "tragedy of
the anticommons" occurs when there are many patent holders each
claiming a sequence or fragment.' 38 For instance, many different SNP
sequences can be patented, resulting in many different patent owners
holding exclusive rights. Often, common diseases in humans are not
caused by a genetic variation within a single gene but are influenced
by complex interactions among multiple genes.139 Therefore, multiple
SNPs would be needed to conduct research on a single disease. In
this case, when a scientist wants to study a disease or research for a
new drug using relevant SNPs on a microarray chip, he would have to
obtain multiple licenses from multiple patent holders. Even if he
wants to use very short fragments not exclusively claimed but falling
within the sequence of longer strands of DNA that are patented, he
would also need to get a license. The cost and effort needed to secure
various licenses could be detrimental to future research. Usually
when a patent license is prepared, professional and legal assistance is
sought to determine the scope of license, and to negotiate and draft
licensing agreements. 140  While getting a good royalty rate is the
133. Id.
134. John H. Barton, Patents, Genomics, Research, and Diagnostics, 77 ACAD. MED.
1339, 1339 (Dec. 2002).
135. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 130, at 698.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 699.
138. Id.
139. SNP Fact Sheet, Human Genome Project Information, at
http://www.oml.gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/faq/snps.shtml (visited Jan. 19, 2004).
140. See generally CHARLES M. FOX, WORKING WITH CONTRACTS - WHAT LAW SCHOOL
DOESN'T TEACH YOU (Jan. 2002).
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major focus of a licensing deal, the related "hidden" transactional
expenses should not be overlooked. As multiple licenses are
necessary, standardized agreements may not work for all licensors, so
individual agreements must be prepared. To secure a license,
negotiation with the patent holder is necessary to secure deals
beneficial to the licensee. When there are multiple patents involved,
the legal counsel would have to negotiate with each patent holder for
each license. All the work involved with obtaining multiple licenses
would dramatically increase the total cost of research.141 As a result,
it would be too expensive to conduct research. Eventually the
"overlapping patent filing" and the piling of numerous license
agreements may plague research and product development.1
42
The second mechanism by which the "tragedy" may emerge is
under the effect of "stacking licenses," which result from the use of
reach-through licenses. 143  Reach-through licensing is a way of
licensing patent rights, where the patented technology is used in
upstream research, not directly incorporated into the downstream
product, and royalties are determined by a percentage of sales of the
end products. 144 For instance, the patent holder of a DNA sequence
can collect royalties based on the sales of a licensee's end products
even if the licensee only uses the patented sequence in research for its
end product, which does not specifically incorporate the patented
sequence. Theoretically, reach-through licensing provides
opportunities for researchers with limited resources to use patented
technologies and defer royalty payments until valuable results and
end products are produced by the research.145  In return, patent
holders collect bigger compensation from the sales of downstream
products.
However, in reality, problems arise when upstream patent
holders "stack overlapping and inconsistent claims on potential
downstream products."' 146  This is particularly true when patents
contain claims of wide scope. Often, the term, "comprising," is used
in claims to DNA sequences. In patent law, "comprising" commonly
141. See Kate Murashige, Patents and Research - An Uneasy Alliance, 77 ACAD. MED.
1329, 1330 (Dec. 2002).
142. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 130, at 699.
143. Id.
144. Thomas J. Kowalski & Christian M. Smolizza, Reach-Through Licensing: A US
Perspective, J. OF COM. BIOTECH. (July 14, 2000), at
http://pharmalicensing.com/features/disp/963567614_396edffel 32c5.
145. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 130, at 699.
146. Id.
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means "including."' 147 When a claim is composed with this word, it is
"open-ended to the addition of [DNA sequence] elements not recited
in the claim itself, and would be infringed even if the accused
sequence contains elements other than" the sequence described in the
claim. 48 With such wide claims, patent holders are able to "expand"
their negotiating power at the bargaining table; the result is that the
"reach-through" patents have become "profit-draining
encumbrances."'149 Therefore, if downstream product development is
over-shadowed by heavy licensing fees of upstream research tools,
potential licensees will be discouraged from investing funds into
product development, and consequently, both upstream research tools
and downstream development will come to suffer "the tragedy of the
anticommons."1 50
B. Exclusive Ownership of Diagnostic Tools
Many professional associations of doctors and clinical
geneticists openly criticize the patenting of sequences with diagnostic
functions.15 ' They believe exclusive ownership over diagnostic genes
interferes with the practice of medicine and hinders "incremental
innovation" in DNA diagnostics. 152
A patent owner has exclusive power to determine who may
lawfully use his or her invention. The patent holder of a diagnostic
sequence may "prevent any other entity from testing for a particular
disease gene."'153  For instance, medical research is likely to be
hindered by the patenting of SNPs with strong implications to a
predisposing condition.' 54  To maximize the understanding of a
disease, a researcher would need to examine the expression of a wide
range of genes, and "correlate these expressions with the specific
characteristics of the patient that are revealed by a specific SNP.'
147. Goldstein & Golod, supra note 117, at 1319.
148. Id. Compare the use of "comprising" with the use of "consisting of' "claim language
where "consisting of"' is said to be "closed," and "is not infringed by the addition of other,
unrecited elements to the basic elements of the claim." Id.
149. See id. at 1325. See also Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 130, at 699.
150. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 130, at 699.
151. Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 1382.
152. Id. at 1383.
153. Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives With
Health Needs, 2 HOuS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 65, 89 (2002).
154. Barton, supra note 134, at 1340.
155. Id.
INSUFFICIENT GENE PATENT SYSTEM
However, his mission will not be accomplished if the patent owner of
the particular SNP refuses to grant a license.
Moreover, the quality of diagnostic tests and accessibility to
them has become a concern. The patent holder or exclusive license
holder is the only entity that may legally use the patented diagnostic
sequence and develop tests that use the sequence. Currently,
diagnostic testing services conducted in-house are faced with less
stringent regulatory structures than testing performed by distributed
products. 156 To avoid demanding regulations, a patent holder tends to
require that samples be sent to the holder's own lab rather than to
develop and distribute a readily available kit.157 For example, Myriad
Genetics, the patent holder of the breast cancer gene, BRCA1, has
demanded all samples for BRCA diagnostic testing be sent to its main
laboratory in Utah.' 58 On the other hand, medical practitioners prefer
using facilities within their institutions for diagnostic testing rather
than shipping the samples off to a distant laboratory. 59 However,
lacking permission from the patent holder to use the patented
sequences at their preferred locations, doctors are left with no choice
but sending their samples to sites designated by the patent holder.
The resulting effect of these confining restrictions imposed by patent
owners of DNA diagnostic tests is seen as "an unaccustomed obstacle
to their work as healthcare providers and researchers."' 160
Furthermore, accessible and affordable healthcare is at the center
of concerns. Because patent owners have the right to exclude others
from making or using the patented invention,'16 they are in the
exclusive position to decide how the patented DNA diagnostic
sequence might be used or developed. Often, the patent holder who
desires to maintain domination on the market chooses to develop
further diagnostic tests and kits on its own, instead of licensing the
technology to third parties. Myriad Genetics is a perfect example. It
holds patents both on the BRCA1 gene and diagnostic tests using the
gene.162 It has not licensed any other firm to develop a different
testing method or to conduct breast cancer diagnostic tests using
BRCA1 genes. In the meantime, Myriad charges $2,680.00 for each
diagnostic test carried out at its own labs in Utah, the only labs
156. Andrews, supra note 153, at 77.
157. Id.
158. NUFFIELD COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 39-40.
159. Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 1382.
160. Id.
161. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000).
162. NUFFIELD COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 39-40.
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allowed to conduct such testing. 163 Alternatively, patent holders of
DNA diagnostic sequences may choose to grant exclusive licenses to
large corporations with strong financial promises. The licensee is
then able to control the market for the patented DNA sequences.
Either scheme leads to limitations on "innovation and
development of alternative potentially higher-quality or lower-cost
methods." 164  If a patent sanctioned monopoly in the market of
diagnostic testing were created, the resulting limited access to
healthcare would place patients, who need genetic testing, in a highly
disadvantageous position.
C. Problem of Submarine Patents
The use of DNA sequences as research tools is faced with legal
challenges. Those who oppose the patenting of research tools say
many sequences claimed by patent applications lack utility as
required by 35 U.S.C. § 101. ESTs and SNPs are examples of such
accused research tools. ESTs are used to locate useful full genes.
Thus, they have high value in downstream research platforms that
"open up new and uncharted areas of investigation."' 165 Since NIH
initiated the patenting of ESTs, the USPTO has received a large influx
of patent applications for ESTs. In the race for patent grants,
inventors file for patents as quickly as possible; sometimes even
before functions of the target product encoded by the claimed
sequences are fully elucidated.166  Therefore, they assert that the
sequences are useful as research reagents or probes, or speculate that
the sequences can be used to diagnose disorders. Consequently,
applications are filed with "best guess" utilities, which are insufficient
to satisfy the statutory requirements for patenting.
The problem of "submarine patents" arises when patents are
sought for gene sequences of which functions are not fully
understood.1 67 A "submarine patent" is a slang term for a patent with
broad claims that "surfaces when another inventor's work gives it
commercial significance."'' 68 For example, an inventor discovered a
163. Wadman, supra note 26.
164. Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test, 415 NATURE 577, 579. (Feb. 7,
2002).
165. Arti K. Rai, Genome Patents: A Case Study in Patenting Research Tools, 77 ACAD.
MED. 1368, 1369 (Dec. 2002).
166. NUFFIELD COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 56.
167. Andrews, supra note 153, at 86.
168. Kathleen A. Marrs, Patents: Genes as Intellectual Property, at
http://www.biology.iupui.edu/biocourses/Bio1540/11 patents2k 1 .html. (Oct. 23, 2001).
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particular function of a DNA sequence, and, then, his patent
application with broad claims over the sequence was issued.
Subsequently, another inventor, through his or her independent effort,
finds the gene possesses a new function or use, which was unknown
to the first inventor. Although the USPTO does not bar the second
inventor from obtaining a patent on his or her discovery, it holds that
the second inventor must obtain a license from the first inventor in
order to use the patented sequence. 169 As a result, the first inventor is
able to preclude the second inventor from making or using the
patented sequence.
Human Genome Sciences' (HGS) patent 70 on the CCR5 gene
has been criticized as a "submarine patent.' 71 HGS claimed that
CCR5 codes for chemokine receptor and covered "all possible
embodiments associated with the receptor, including 'all DNA and
amino acid sequences corresponding to the receptor or virtually any
portion thereof, and any process for making, using or administering
the receptor, including diagnostic assays.""172  Later, a group of
researchers at NIH discovered that CCR5 receptor was responsible for
binding to the HIV virus, which was unknown to HGS when it filed
the patent application for CCR5 gene. Nonetheless, the HGS patent
had already covered nearly all potential uses of the CCR5 gene. As a
result, HGS is able to preclude the NIH researchers from continuing
research on CCR5's role and functions related to HIV. 173
Although the USPTO holds a view that the issuing of broad
claims over upstream research tools does not preclude the second
inventor from patenting his or her discovery, and does not deter
inventions in genomics, these "submarine patents" have caused the
scientific community to warn that patents on early scientific processes
create "a disincentive for the further research necessary to actually
provide a health benefit."'
7 4
VI. ANSWERS TO THE IMPERFECT GENE PATENT SYSTEM
There are two existing schemes, the utility examination
guidelines and inter partes re-examination procedure, both of which
169. Doll, supra note 23, at 690.
170. U.S. Patent No. 6,025,154 (issued Feb. 15, 2000).
171. Andrews, supra note 153, at 87.
172. Id. (citing Pat Carson & Melissa Mandrgoc, Gene-Based Drugs Challenge Patent
Process, 226 N.Y. L.J. S5, S8 (Oct. 15, 2001)).
173. Andrews, supra note 153, at 88.
174. Id.
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can be used to address the concerns associated with gene patenting.
First, the USPTO's refined utility examination guidelines can serve as
a gatekeeper against insubstantial patent claims on gene sequences.
Second, the inter partes re-examination procedure can be used as an
alternative approach to challenge invalid patents.
A. Existing Schemes That Can Be Used to Alleviate Concerns
1. 2001 Utility Examination Guidelines
In 2001, the USPTO modified its utility examination guidelines
in response to the widespread outcry regarding gene patenting. 175 In
particular, the guidelines were put in place to address the issue of
DNA sequence inventions not having a sufficient utility. In affirming
that DNA fragments, such as ESTs and SNPs, are patentable, the new
guidelines raised the standard for utility requirements by requiring all
inventions related to gene sequences to have a utility that is well-
established, or specific, substantial and credible. 176 In other words,
the new standard calls for all patentable sequences to have a well-
known utility that is either "immediately apparent, or implied by the
specification's disclosure" of the invention, considered with the
knowledge of one skilled in the art. 177 Alternatively, in the absence of
a well-established utility, the inventor may assert a utility that is
particular to the subject matter claimed, defines a "real world" use,
and is currently available for use. 178 The USPTO clarified that the
inventor cannot advance a "throw away" utility, or a use of sequences
"as a gene probe or chromosome marker."' 79 Consequently, the new
guidelines will become a gatekeeper to preclude insubstantial
inventions with inadequate utilities from being patented. Also, they
will prevent frivolous patents from blocking the genomic frontier. 180
175. Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 14, at 1092.
176. Id. at 1093, cmt. 2.
177. THE U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REVISED INTERIM UTILITY GUIDELINES
TRAINING MATERIALS, at 7, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/utility.pdf (1999)
[hereinafter TRAINING MATERIALS].
178. Id. at 6.
179. See id. at 5, 7.
180. John J. Doll, Talking Gene Patents, 285 SCIENTIFIC AM. 28 (Aug. 2001), available at
http://watson.fapesp.br/nuplitec/artigos/scieamer.htm (Aug. 17, 2001) (last visited Jan. 19,
2004).
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2. Inter Partes Re-examination Procedure
The USPTO's inter partes re-examination procedure is a
"potentially useful" tool in challenging invalid patents.18' It can
operate as a cheaper alternative to litigation for resolving simple
disputes. Re-examination is a procedure by which "the patentee or a
third party may request that the USPTO reexamine any patent claim
in view of cited prior art."18 2 The first re-examination statute was
enacted in 1980.183 Congress intended the statute to achieve the three
principle benefits - providing an avenue to "settle validity disputes
more quickly and less expensively," allowing courts to refer patent
validity questions to an agency with expertise in both the patent law
and technology," and strengthen "investor confidence in the certainty
of patent rights by affording an opportunity to review patents of
doubtful validity.' ' 184  To use the re-examination procedure, the
requester must set forth a "substantial new question of patentability"
based on a prior art document. 185  The re-examination process is
conducted according to the procedure established for initial
examination. 186 Prior to 1999, a third party requester's involvement
in the process was limited to filing the initial re-examination request
and a reply to the patent owner's statement. 187 In 1999, the Optional
Inter Partes Re-examination Procedure Act was passed and provided
for an optional inter partes procedure. 188 Under the new procedure,
third party requesters are able to participate in the re-examination
process in a more meaningful fashion. They have the opportunity to
file written comments within 30 days of each Office Action as well as
to the patent owner's responses. 189 They may refute arguments made
by the patent owner, present further arguments supporting the
181. Natalie M. Derzko & John W. Behringer, Inter Partes Reexamination: A Potentially
Useful Approach to Challenging Invalid Biotechnology Patents, 21 NATURE BIOTECH. 823 (Jul.
7, 2003).
182. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 67, at 149.
183. See generally H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, at 6462. (1980).
184. In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 789 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also, H.R. REP.
No. 96-1307 (1980), available at
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted-resources/lipa/patents/PatentMisuse_Reform.pdf (last visited
Jan. 19, 2004); Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 601 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
185. 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
186. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See also DONALD S. CHISUM, 4 CHISUM ON PATENTS §
11.07(4)(d)(ii) (2004).
187. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 67, at 158.
188. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-318(2003).
189. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b).
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examiner's findings, and cite additional prior art that did not become
known or available to the requester until after the request was filed.' 90
Because the inter partes re-examination procedure is relatively
low cost' 9 1 and allows for participation of third party requesters, it has
become an attractive approach to challenging invalid patents with
respect to prior art. However, this procedure is not without its
problems. One of the greatest limitations imposed by the inter partes
re-examination procedure is estoppel.192 First, a third-party requester
is "estopped from asserting at a later time, in a civil action ....... the
invalidity of any claim finally determined to be valid and patentable
on any ground which the third-party raised or could have raised
during the inter partes re-examination proceedings."' 93 However, if
the requester later discovers new "prior art that was not previously
available," he or she may still assert claims of invalidity.' 94 Second, a
third party requester is also estopped from challenging, in a later civil
action, any fact determined during the re-examination process, unless
the fact is later "proved to be erroneous based on information
unavailable at the time of the inter partes reexamination decision."'
' 95
As a result, a third party who is in possession of a new prior art
reference and wishes to challenge the validity of a patent through the
inter partes re-examination proceeding may be deterred from
instituting such processes. Parties fear that in the event that the
USPTO rules in favor of the patent holder, it could never rely on the
same reference again to try to invalidate the claims, either in a
subsequent inter partes re-examination proceeding or a civil action.
Also, if a party has a particular prior art reference that was available
but not used at the inter partes re-examination proceeding, it would
have become an issue that could have been raised, and the party could
be precluded from raising any validity issue related to this prior art.
Consequently, these substantial risks would have a deterrent effect on
anyone who wishes to use this procedure.
96
190. 37 C.F.R. § 1.948 (2003).
191. The estimated average cost for a reexamination proceeding is $8800, a relatively low
expenditure compared to the costs of litigation. See Rules to Implement Optional Inter Partes
Reexamination Proceedings, 65 Fed. Reg. 76756, 76757 (Dec. 7, 2000).
192. Derzko & Behringer, supra note 181, at 824.
193. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). See also Derzko & Behringer, supra note 181, at 824
194. Derzko & Behringer, supra note 181, at 824.
195. Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4607 (Nov. 29, 1999). See also Derzko & Behringer, supra
note 181, at 824; CHISUM ET AL., supra note 67, at 159.
196. See Derzko & Behringer, supra note 181, at 824.
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In order to allow the inter partes re-examination procedure to
serve its intended purposes, modification to the system is needed. A
new bill should be introduced to remove the estoppel provisions from
patent statutes. Third party requesters ought to be allowed to reassert
the invalidity of claims in another civil action, rely on the prior art
reference that was not used in previous inter partes re-examination
proceedings, and challenge any fact determined in the proceeding.
Once the restraints are eliminated, third party rights will be protected.
Everyone who is interested in challenging the validity of a patent
based on prior art will be able to fully benefit from the advantages the
inter partes re-examination procedure has to offer.
However, even with modifications, the existing procedures alone
will not be adequate to address the concerns posed by gene patenting.
Additional changes to the system are needed to allow patents on DNA
sequences to serve their intended purposes in promoting exchange of
information, attracting investment and advancing technology.
B. Proposed Remedies to Curtail the Negative Impacts from
Gene Patenting
1. Patent Pool
A patent pool can be used to resolve problems created by gene
patenting. Pooling patents on gene sequences will provide social and
economic benefits including the elimination of problems caused by
"blocking" patents and "stacked licenses," a significant reduction of
licensing transaction costs, an increased likelihood of recovering
R&D costs, and the promotion of technological information
exchange.'
97
A patent pool is "an agreement between two or more patent
owners to license one or more of their patents to one another or third
parties."' 98 A patent pool may also be defined as the "aggregation of
intellectual property rights which are the subject of cross-licensing,
whether they are transferred directly by patentee to licensee or
197. See generally Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions:
The Case of Patent Pools, 43-44 (Aug. 1999), at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges/pools.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
198. James Love, An Essential Health Care Patent Pool, Address at the 14th Annual AIDS
Conference in Barcelona (July 8, 2002), available at http://www.cptech.org/cm/patentpool.html
(last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
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through some medium, such as a joint venture, set up specifically to
administer the patent pool." 199
In the past, patent pools have notably affected the legal and
industrial history of the United States.2 ° ° In the last one hundred and
fifty years, patent pools have taken many different forms.2 0 1 One of
the first patent pools formed in 1856 consisted of sewing machine
patents.20 2  The aviation and radio industries subsequently created
patent pools in the early 1900s. The aircraft patent pool of 1917
allowed the production of new aircrafts, which was initially controlled
and blocked by two major patent holders. 20 3 This pool was crucial to
the U.S. government since it fulfilled the desperate need for airplanes
as the country prepared to enter World War 1.204 The standardization
of radio parts, airway frequency locations and television transmission
standards were made possible by the creation of the Radio
Corporation of America, an organization designed to control the
licensing of the large number of radio patents, which combined the
interests of companies like American Marconi, General Electric,
AT&T, and Westinghouse.20 5 More recent patent pools were formed
in 1998 and 1999 to control DVD-ROM and DVD-Video standard
specifications and formats.20 6
The U.S. law affecting patent pools has also changed
dramatically. In the early 1900's, courts established the dominance of
patent law over antitrust law, giving patent pooling activities virtual
199. Joel I. Klein, Cross-Licensing and Antritrust Law, Address at the American
Intellectual Property Law Association Spring Meeting (May 2, 1997), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1123.htm.
200. Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359,
373 (1999).
201. David B. Resnik, A Biotechnology Patent Pool: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 3 J.
OF PHIL., SC. & L. § 6, available at
http://www.psljoumal.com/archives/papersibiotechpatent.cfm (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
202. See Merges, surpa note 197, at 17.
203. Harry T. Dykman, Patent Licensing Within the Manufacturer' s Aircraft Association,
46 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 646, 648 (1964).
204. See id. at 647-48.
205. See The Radio Manufacturers Association, at
http://www.netsonian.com/antiqueradio/radiodocs/RETMA/ccodeindex.htm
(last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
206. See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't of Just., Antitrust Div., to
Garrard R. Beeney, Esq. (Dec. 16, 1998), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.htm; Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att'y
Gen., Dep't of Just., Antitrust Div., to Carey R. Ramos, Esq. (June 10, 1999), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publicbusreview/'2485.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
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immunity from the Sherman Act.20 7  Over the next forty years,
however, patent pools were faced with serious setbacks as the courts
"target[ed] patent pools as shelters of collusive activit[ies]. 2 °8 The
courts dissolved several major patent pools. 20 9  Toward the end of
the1960s, the Department of Justice (DOJ) deployed an aggressive
policy against patent licensing. The department announced nine
patent licensing activities, known as the "Nine No-Nos," as per se
antitrust violations.21 °  This policy hindered patent holders'
motivation to collaborate through the use of patent pools.
2 11
Consequently, as a result of policy mandates, few patent pools remain
today.212
It was not until recently that patent pools are again being
recognized by the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for
their "pro-competitive" effects and capabilities in promoting
propagation of technology.1 3 In 1995, the DOJ and FTC issued
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (IP
Guidelines) setting forth policies for the enforcement of intellectual
property licensing. 14 The IP Guidelines provide that intellectual
property pooling is valuable when it is pro-competitive. Patent pools'
pro-competitive function can be achieved when the pool integrates
complementary technologies, reduces transaction costs, clears
blocking positions, avoids costly infringement litigation, and
promotes dissemination of technology. 2
15
In order to tackle the problems caused by gene patenting, a "pro-
competitive" patent pool containing patents on gene sequences needs
to be created. The pool would be administered by an independent
207. See generally E. Bement & Sons v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902) (holding
that party's decision to grant an exclusive license to use a patent did not violate antitrust laws).
See also Carlson, supra note 200, at 373.
208. Carlson, supra note 200, at 374.
209. See Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1920) (dissolving a
patent pool that fixed prices and excluded unlicensed manufacturers); Hartford-Empire Co. v.
United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945) (dissolving a patent pool of major glass manufacturers
because the pool allowed its members to maintain unreasonably high prices).
210. Carlson, supra note 200, at 375.
211. Seeid. at 376.
212. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1293, 1355 (1996) ("[F]ederal antitrust policy
is the most likely explanation for the small number of patent pools existing today.").
213. Id.
214. U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Apr. 6, 1995), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm. (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
215. Id. at 27-28.
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non-profit organization that maintains the patent portfolio and
oversees strict regulations for the pool. The administrator would be in
charge of collecting and distributing royalties and enforcing and
terminating licenses. 216  Additionally, the administrator can also
solicit and negotiate licenses to non-members on behalf of its
participating members to maximize the values of patents in the
pool.217 An automated database linked with the USPTO should be put
in place to monitor and flag changes to patents' status, to maintain the
integrity of the pool by eliminating expired or unscrupulous patents in
a timely manner. The pool would be created with a mechanism in
place that would act to avoid antitrust problems. Licensing fees
should be determined according to market values, which can be
achieved by regular market evaluations. All members participating in
the pool should agree to license their patents to prevent blocking
patents from arising. To "maximize convenience and access and
minimize transaction costs," the patent pool should be
"comprehensive in scope." 218 The sequence patent pool needs to have
a broad horizontal scope within a discipline.21 9 For instance, it should
encompass "genetic information likely associated with a particular
biological function., 220  Particularly, it may include DNA, RNA,
proteins, receptors and more. Moreover, the pool may be furnished
with a "more vertical integration of scientific methods across various
disciplines, 221 incorporating techniques such as recombinant DNA
technology, gene therapy techniques, cell lines, computer modeling,
and more. Finally, to protect the rights of pool members, information
contained in the pool is open to the public with a nominal access fee
for participating members and a slightly higher fee for non-members.
This format is analogous to that of the music industry in managing
copyrights.
A sequence pool with the design mentioned above will be
beneficial to patent holders and the public at large. The major
problem of gene patenting, "the tragedy of the anticommons," will be
addressed by the pool. First, the pool would significantly reduce
216. Lawrence M. Sung, Greater Predictability May Result in Patent Pools, Presented at
FTC/DOJ Hearings to Highlight Business and Economic Perspectives on Competition and
Intellectual Property Policy 6 (Apr. 17, 2002), available at
http://www.flc.gov/opp/intellect/020417lawrencemsung I .pdf (last visited Jan 20, 2004).
217. Resnik, supra note 201.
218. Id.
219. Sung, supra note 216, at 6.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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transaction costs. It would be fairly easy and simple to obtain
necessary licenses to use patented gene sequences. A researcher, who
would otherwise need to obtain licenses from multiple parties, now
would only have to contact one entity to secure a number of licenses,
saving time, money and resources. 222 Second, the pool can alleviate
the problem associated with "stacking licenses." By abolishing
"reach-through" licensing agreements, the pool would encourage
cooperative efforts needed to realize the true economic values of
genomic inventions. 223 It would provide sufficient access to patented
technologies. A party in need of a patented sequence would not have
to fear rejection from patent holders, nor need to take a compromising
reach-through license with high license fees. By using the pool, he or
she would be confident of obtaining a license to use the patented
sequence at a reasonable royalty rate.
Furthermore, a sequence pool will increase the likelihood of a
company recouping its investments in research and development. A
structure built into the pool can allow all members to receive a set
income based on a percentage of the pool's royalty regardless of the
economic value. This arrangement distributes benefits and risks
evenly to all its members,224 thus providing incentives for inventors to
participate in the pool. Also, the pool fosters free information
exchange among its members and licensees. 225 The more information
a party receives, the more competitive it gets. As more members join
into the pool, more information would be available for exchange. In
order to maximize limited resources, participants would be motivated
to share information and avoid overlapping efforts. Consequently,
upstream research and downstream product development will be more
efficient as each party focuses on its core abilities, thereby advancing
genomic innovations at a faster pace.
Lastly, the use of a patent pool would make patented diagnostic
sequences more accessible and more convenient. The pool would not
preclude anyone from using the patented sequences. As more parties
are allowed to use patented sequences and build on them, more
competitive diagnostic products will be introduced to the market. It
would drive up the quality while lowering the cost of diagnostic
testing tools. Meanwhile, the pool would also produce an inhibiting
effect on monopoly. Doctors, who wish to use a patented diagnostic
222. See Merges, supra note 197, at 25.
223. See Sung & Pelto, supra note 216, at 3-5.
224. See id.
225. Merges, supra note 197, at 22.
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tool to detect the presence of certain diseases in their patients, would
no longer be compelled to send samples to the patent holder's
laboratory for results. Upon acquisition of a license through the
patent pool, physicians would be able to conduct testing procedures
within their own facilities. Moreover, by allowing greater
involvement by more parties, implementation of patent pools would
ensure that essential inventions are fully exploited and appreciated.
In addition to reducing transaction costs, the pool would serve to
promote wide adoption of patented inventions and related products.
Eventually, the public will be benefited by more affordable and easily
accessible diagnostic tests.
2. Research Exemptions
In addition to a patent pool that preserves the incentive nature of
the patent system, Congress should enact a research exemption for
non-commercial researchers. The exemption would allow researchers
226to utilize patented genetic sequences for non-commercial purposes.
A researcher, who experiments to understand and improve the
patented product or method, would not be held liable for
infringement. In contrast, a developer who experiments to exploit the
invention would be liable for infringement. 227 Such an exemption
addresses the "perceived need to allow patents for developing new
research tools and instrumentation.,
228
The U.S. patent law does not have a statutory exemption for non-
commercial or experimental use of a patented invention, except for
two specific provisions, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) and § 287 (c). Section
271(e)(1), enacted in 1984 as part of the Hatch-Waxman Act, exempts
infringing activities that are "solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information" to the Food and Drug
Administration for approval.229  Section 287(c) releases medical
practitioners and institutions from liability if they merely practice a
patented procedure of treatment that does not involve a patented drug
or device. 23  Neither of these two exemptions applies to the use of
patented inventions in research or experimental contexts.
226. Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in
the United States and the European Union: an Argument for Compulsory Licensing and A Fair-
Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1623, 1684 (Dec. 2001).
227. Barton, supra note 134, at 1342.
228. Id.
229. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
230. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c).
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Nonetheless, the academic community would argue that a
judicial doctrine of experimental use defense should be available.
The original evidence for this claim dates back to 1813. In
Whittemore v. Cutter, the Supreme Court said in dictum that "it could
never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who
constructed [a patented] machine merely for philosophical
experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the
machine to produce its described effects.",23' Although the statement
had no binding effect on subsequent courts, it paved the road for
experimental defense. By 1861, it was well settled that
experimentation "for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical
taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement" is not infringement. 232 In
1935, the court in Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Co. held that
the use of a patented invention in a university laboratory meets the
criteria of experimental use defense.233 However, in recent years,
courts have been leaning toward the other direction. Twenty years
ago, in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., the Federal
Circuit denied that the experimental use defense applies to a generic
drug manufacturer's use of a patented drug to carry out clinical
trials.234 Congress responded to the decision by enacting the Hatch-
Waxman Act to expressly permit this particular experimental use.235
The most recent decision addressing the applicability of the
236
experimental use defense is found in Madey v. Duke University.
The Federal Circuit further narrowed the scope of the experimental
use defense. The court concluded that the important factor is whether
the use of patented inventions was "in keeping with the alleged
infringer's legitimate business, regardless of commercial
implications. 237 When noncommercial projects at a major research
institution "unmistakably further the institution's legitimate business
objectives, including educating and enlightening students and faculty
participating in these projects," the experimental use defense is not
applicable.238 The ramifications of this decision is alarming as it
virtually makes the experimental use defense worthless to research
institutions.
231. 29F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (D. Mass. 1813).
232. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1861).
233. 13 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1935).
234. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
235. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
236. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
237. Id. at 1362.
238. Id.
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In contrast to the U.S., patent laws in European Union nations
and Japan contain statutory exemption provisions for research.2 39 The
EU's provisions expressly exempt liability for otherwise infringing
"acts done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of
the patented invention."2 40 The European case law also supports that
the experimental use doctrine may be applied not only to non-
commercial situations but also to a commercial context under certain
circumstances.
241
Research exemptions in the U.S. are urgently needed to allow the
academic community to continue to pursue its mission. One of the
major objectives for research universities is to "push the needle on the
state of the art, to pinch, touch, poke and feel the latest
innovations. ,241 Without a research exemption from patent
infringement claims, researchers operate without shields when they
are immersed into works that further their main goal of developing
cutting edge technologies. Researchers should not live in fear that a
patent owner might assert an infringement claim against them. Non-
commercial research efforts should not be undermined because patent
rights produce a curtailing side effect.
It is clear that there is an immediate need for Congress to codify
statutory provisions to exempt non-commercial research activities.
Statutory exemption provisions would provide researchers with a
solid legal base for asserting the experimental use defense against
infringement actions. They would also protect academicians
conducting research from undesirable situations where the patent
owner is unwilling to grant licenses. 243 Furthermore, the exemptions
would help to sustain the confidence of research communities by
allowing more freedom in utilizing patented technologies.
As an example, to facilitate research exemptions, Congress could
pass the two bills introduced by Representative Lynn Rivers of
Michigan in 2002, the Genomic Science and Technology Innovation
239. Murashige, supra note 141, at 1335. See also William R. Cornish, Experimental Use
of Patented Inventions in European Community States, 29 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 735, 735-36 (1998).
240. Gitter, supra note 226, at 1689 (citing Gen'l Secretariate of the Council of the Eur.
Communities, Records of the Luxembourg Conference on the Community Patent 1973 [sic,
1975], art. 31(b), at 302).
241. Cornish, supra note 239.
242. Stephen B. Maebius & Harold C. Wegner, The Looming Crisis Over the Research
Use Exception To Patent Infringement: What Madey Taught Duke University, FindLaw.com, at
http://library.1p.findlaw.com/educationlaw1 145_I.html (Jan. 2003) (last visited Jan. 20,
2004).
243. Gitter, supra note 226, at 1686.
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Act of 2002 ("Innovation Act")244 and the Genomic Research and
Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002 ("Accessibility Act").245  The
bills were created to address the increasingly burdensome effects of
human gene patenting. They are intended to provide limited
exemptions "designed to minimize some of the negative impacts of
[gene] patents on the practice of medicine and the advancement of
science. 246
The Innovation Act requests the Director of the Office of
Science and Technology Policy to conduct studies on the effects of
247gene patenting. The study would assess the impact of gene
patenting on genomic technology innovation, and examine the current
intellectual property schemes, as well as alternative mechanisms of
protection and incentives. The Accessibility Act proposes two
exemptions and a provision on rapid disclosure of genomic sequence
information. 248 The first provision contains an exemption for research
uses. Defining research as an investigation "designed to develop or
contribute to generalized knowledge, 2 49 the provision exempts uses
of patented gene sequence information for non-commercial research
purposes. It also provides that, if a researcher discovers a valuable
commercial application, the researcher may not exploit it without
permission from the patent holder. The second section introduces a
diagnostic use exemption. 250 Without this provision, physicians may
be using less effective methods because of fear of infringement, and
time-consuming license negotiation may block the usage of the most
effective disease detection systems. Under this exemption, medical
personnel may use genetic diagnostic tests without being subject to
patent infringement actions. 25  Broader than the current exemption
under section 287(c), the new provision protects not only uses of
patented procedures but also uses of patented products, giving more
discretion to physicians. Lastly, the third section of the Accessibility
Act calls for a faster disclosure of genetic sequence information
contained in patent applications that are filed for inventions funded by
244. Genomic Science & Technology Innovation Act of 2002, H.R. 3966, 107th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2002) [hereinafter Innovation Act].
245. Genomic Research & Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 107th Cong.
(2d Sess. 2002) [hereinafter Accessibility Act].
246. 148 CONG. REc. E. 353 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002) (remarks by Rep. Rivers).
247. Innovation Act, supra note 244.
248. Accessibility Act, supra note 245.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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the federal government. To promote information sharing in a timely
manner, this provision requests the information to be published in 30
days from the filing of application, instead of 18 months under the
USPTO's guidelines.
Together the two bills will serve to protect the interests of
researchers working on projects without commercial purposes. They
would enhance the "availability and usefulness of gene-based
diagnostics in the overall health care system," and to allow for the
"essential medical progress to continue un-abated. 2 2
VII. CONCLUSION
In the past 200 years, patents have played a remarkable role in
encouraging technological inventions and promoting commercial
development.25 3 The inherent innovative nature of the patent system
will likely allow genomic patents to be embedded in bioscience and
be carried into the next biological revolution. Because DNA
sequences are uniquely different from traditionally patented subject
matters, changes are necessary to resolve the shortcomings caused by
gene patents.
Viewed constructively, the existing policies, the USPTO's
revised utility examination guidelines and inter partes re-examination
procedure, will serve to resolve some of the present concerns on gene
patenting. By requiring all gene related inventions to have a well-
established utility or an asserted utility that is specific, substantial and
credible, the guidelines will become a gatekeeper against insubstantial
patents. The inter partes re-examination procedures provide an
inexpensive and quick means for a third party to challenge invalid
patents.
In addition to current schemes, a patent pool and a research
exemption should be built into the system. A pool of genomic patents
will be an effective solution to avert "the tragedy of anticommons."
By designing and implementing a patent pool that promotes
information sharing and encourages cooperation among patent
holders, both comercial industry and the general public will be
granted efficient access to patented sequences. Ultimately, the pool
will serve to eliminate any hindering effects from patenting DNA
sequences. A statutory research exemption provision will relieve the
restraints that gene patents have placed on non-commercial research.
252. 148 CONG. REC. E. 353 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002) (remarks by Rep. Rivers).
253. David Kom & Stephen J. Heinig, Introduction: Patents, Genomics, and Academic
Medicine, 77 ACAD. MED. 1301 (Dec. 2002).
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The exemption will allow researchers, even with limited financial
resources, to access the latest inventions and discoveries without
worrying about infringing others' patents. The research community
as a whole will benefit from the freedom to work with and build on
patented technologies.
By integrating plausible mechanisms, gene patenting will foster
more genomic inventions and discoveries, further information
dissemination and sharing, allow more competitive products to be
cultivated, and ultimately provide essential benefits to the public.
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information.2 48 The first provision contains an exemption for research
uses. Defining research as an investigation "designed to develop or
contribute to generalized knowledge," 249 the provision exempts uses
of patented gene sequence information for non-commercial research
purposes. It also provides that, if a researcher discovers a valuable
commercial application, the researcher may not exploit it without
permission from the patent holder. The second section introduces a
250diagnostic use exemption. Without this provision, physicians may
be using less effective methods because of fear of infringement, and
time-consuming license negotiation may block the usage of the most
effective disease detection systems. Under this exemption, medical
personnel may use genetic diagnostic tests without being subject to
patent infringement actions.251 Broader than the current exemption
under section 287(c), the new provision protects not only uses of
patented procedures but also uses of patented products, giving more
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Sess. 2002) [hereinafter Innovation Act].
245. Genomic Research & Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 107th Cong.
(2d Sess. 2002) [hereinafter Accessibility Act].
246. 148 CONG. REC. E. 353 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002) (remarks by Rep. Rivers).
247. Innovation Act, supra note 244.
248. Accessibility Act, supra note 245.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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the federal government. To promote information sharing in a timely
manner, this provision requests the information to be published in 30
days from the filing of application, instead of 18 months under the
USPTO's guidelines.
Together the two bills will serve to protect the interests of
researchers working on projects without commercial purposes. They
would enhance the "availability and usefulness of gene-based
diagnostics in the overall health care system," and to allow for the
"essential medical progress to continue un-abated., 252
VII. CONCLUSION
In the past 200 years, patents have played a remarkable role in
encouraging technological inventions and promoting commercial
development.5 3 The inherent innovative nature of the patent system
will likely allow genomic patents to be embedded in bioscience and
be carried into the next biological revolution. Because DNA
sequences are uniquely different from traditionally patented subject
matters, changes are necessary to resolve the shortcomings caused by
gene patents.
Viewed constructively, the existing policies, the USPTO's
revised utility examination guidelines and inter partes re-examination
procedure, will serve to resolve some of the present concerns on gene
patenting. By requiring all gene related inventions to have a well-
established utility or an asserted utility that is specific, substantial and
credible, the guidelines will become a gatekeeper against insubstantial
patents. The inter partes re-examination procedures provide an
inexpensive and quick means for a third party to challenge invalid
patents.
In addition to current schemes, a patent pool and a research
exemption should be built into the system. A pool of genomic patents
will be an effective solution to avert "the tragedy of anticommons."
By designing and implementing a patent pool that promotes
information sharing and encourages cooperation among patent
holders, both comercial industry and the general public will be
granted efficient access to patented sequences. Ultimately, the pool
will serve to eliminate any hindering effects from patenting DNA
sequences. A statutory research exemption provision will relieve the
restraints that gene patents have placed on non-commercial research.
252. 148 CONG. REC. E. 353 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002) (remarks by Rep. Rivers).
253. David Kom & Stephen J. Heinig, Introduction: Patents, Genomics, and Academic
Medicine, 77 ACAD. MED. 1301 (Dec. 2002).
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The exemption will allow researchers, even with limited financial
resources, to access the latest inventions and discoveries without
worrying about infringing others' patents. The research community
as a whole will benefit from the freedom to work with and build on
patented technologies.
By integrating plausible mechanisms, gene patenting will foster
more genomic inventions and discoveries, further information
dissemination and sharing, allow more competitive products to be
cultivated, and ultimately provide essential benefits to the public.

